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EXEMPTIONS - Loss OF HoMESTEAo EXEMPTION - Due to inability to
make a living, the defendant and his family left their homestead in 1932 with
the intention of re-occupying it as soon as they secured enough money to buy
the necessary equipment to maintain themselves on the farm. In October, 1937,
a judgment was recovered by plaintiff against defendant, execution was issued
and levy made on the still vacant homestead, and a date of sale set for June,
1939. Defendant claimed homestead exemption. Held, that since it did not
appear when, if ever, defendant would return to the homestead, the removal
and seven years' absence was an abandonment and the exemption was therefore
lost. Bank of Cruger v. Hodge, (Miss. 1940) 198 So. 26.
The basic principle underlying the homestead exemption statutes is the
protection of the family and not the exemption of a certain amount of real
estate.1 The courts have therefore favored a liberal construction to effectuate the

1 8MYTH, HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTIONS

50-51 (1875).
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intention of the legislature. 2 However, the homestead exemption may be lost
when the occupant abandons the farm as his home. 8 The difficulty arises in
determining when abandonment takes place, since it is purely a question of the
intention with which the owner left the homestead.4 A temporary removal
caused by some necessity or casualty with intent to return is not such an abandonment as will cause a forfeiture of the exemption. 5 A prolonged absence with its
implication as to intention 6 or an intent to return at_ some indefinite future
time,7 although not enough in themselves to cause loss of the exemption, are
factors to be considered. 8 In the principal case the owner was absent for seven
years and intended to return at some indefinite and contingent time. In accordance with the rule of liberal construction of the exemption statutes, many courts, 0
including the Mississippi court, hold that abandonment is established only when
the removal is accompanied by an intent never to return and such intent is
clear beyond all reasonable doubt.10 It would seem that under this view an
intent to return at some indefinite future date contingent upon particular circumstances is sufficient to prevent a forfeiture of the exemption under some
circumstances.11 Although the test of intention is indefinite and provides prac2 Gilmore v. Brown, 93 Miss. 63, 46 So. 840 (1908); Jackson v. Coleman, II5
Miss. 535, 76 So. 545 (1917); Hill v. First Nat. Bank of Marianna, 79 Fla. 391,
84 So. 190 (1920); Andrews v. Security Nat. Bank, 121 Tex. 409, 50 S. W. (2d)
253 (1932).
8
THOMPSON, HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION 217 (1878).
4
Carter v. Pickett, 39 Okla. 144, 134 P. 440 (1913); Russell v. Koller, 70 Okla.
258, 174 P. 560 (1918); Moses v. White, 6 Kan. App. 558, 51 P. 622 (1897).
5
Miss. Code Ann. (1930), § 1776: ''Whenever the debtor shall cease to reside
on his homestead, it shall be liable to his debts, unless his removal be temporary, by
reason of some casualty or necessity, and with the purpose of speedily. reoccupying it
as soon as the cause of absence can be removed." See Thompson v. Tillotson, 56 Miss.
36 (1878); Carter v. Pickett, 39 Okla. 144, 134 P. 440 (1913); Steel v. Blanchette,
193 Mich. 167, 159 N. W. 138 (1916); Bradley v. Humphreys, 191 Ark. 141, 83
S. W. (2d) 828 (1935).
6
Boyer v. Dague, 167 Iowa 212, 149 N. W. 73 (1914); Steel v. Blanchette,
193 Mich. 167, 159 N. W. 138 (1916); Rigdon v. Bogan, 160 La. 551, I07 So. 403
(1926).
1 Brattain v. Hite, IOI Okla. 174, 224 P. 501 (1924); Gulf Production Co.
v. Continental Oil Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) 132 S. W. (2d) 553; Yellow-Hair
v. Pratt, 44 S. D. 136, 182 N. W. 702 (1921).
8
Boyer v. Dague, 167 Iowa 212, 149 N. W. 73 (1914); Yellow-Hair v. Pratt,
44 S. D. 136, 182 N. W. 702 (1921).
9
Carter v. Pickett, 39 Okla. 144, 134 P. 440 (1913); Armstrong v. Neville,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1909) II7 S. W. IOIO; Gulf Production Co. v. Continental Oil
Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) 132 S. W. (2d) 553; Bradley v. Humphreys, 191 Ark.
141, 83 S. W. (2d) 828 (1935).
10
Jackson v. Coleman, II5 Miss. 535, 76 So. 545 (1917).
11
Boyer v. Dague, 167 Iowa 212, 149 N. W. 73 (1914); Schnaffer v. Campbell,
198 Iowa 43, 199 N. W. 334 (1924); Brattain v. Hite, IOI Okla. 174, 224 P. 501
(1924); Hewitt v. Carlson, 60 S. D. 168, 244 N. W. I08 (1932). Contro: Carter v.
Pickett, 39 Okla. 144, 134 P. 440 (1913); White v. Roberts, n2 Ky. 788, 66 S. W.
758 (1902); Russell v. Koller, 70 Okla. 258, 174 P. 560 (1918); Pedersen v. Nielsen, 212 Wis. 608, 250 N. W. 400 (1933). It seems that the only way the cases
dealing with an indefinite intent to return can be reconciled is to say that the courts
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tically no guide for future decision, as long as the policy of the statutes is to provide a home for the family and as long as the loss of exemption is caused by
abandonment and not temporary removal, there seems to be no other solution.
The courts could hold that as a matter of law an absence over a certain number
of years causes loss of the exemption, but since the legislatures have not seen fit
to provide such a standard in the statutes, it is not for the courts to set one.
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weigh the contingencies. In the Pedersen case the court said that the intent to return
was too vague, because the purpose the owner intended to accomplish would take
practically the rest of her life. The courts usually say that no general rule can be
laid down as to the intent required, and that each case is to be decided on its own
particular facts. Yellow-Hair v. Pratt, 44 S. D. 136, 182 N. W. 702 (1921).

